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I am grateful to have the opportunity to be here, to meet with distin-
'guished members of the legal profession and law students and to talk with you
about how well the legal system and our profession are responding to the
challenge of deciding who dies.
This year is the twentieth anniversary of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,' in which the death penalty as it had
existed for 200 years in our country's history was found to be unconstitution-
ally applied. We have now had about nineteen years of experience with the
new death penalty statutes passed after Furman. We are in a position to
examine whether the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman-discri-
mination against minorities and the poor and arbitrariness and capricious-
ness 2 -have been eliminated from the process of imposing death.
We have also just completed the year in which we celebrated the 200th
anniversary of the Bill of Rights. I know that those of you here today
recognize that the Bill of Rights is not a collection of technicalities. The Bill
of Rights is one of the most fundamental and important documents of our
national existence. It is one of our nation's great exports. It is something that
people around the world admire about our country.
It is thus appropriate for us to examine here today how well the Bill of
Rights is being enforced in these cases, cases involving human life; how well
our profession, the legal profession, has fulfilled its responsibility to make the
protections of the Bill of Rights available to those facing the death penalty;
and, finally, whether the Bill of Rights is serving its purpose of protecting the
poorest and most powerless people of our society.
Those are the people that I represent. They are people whose only
protection against the power of the government is the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights. They cannot write their representative or senator seeking legislation
to overturn a Supreme Court decision with which they do not agree. They
cannot afford to hire a former high government official or a high-powered law
firm to lobby for them in Congress to get the laws changed or at least get the
regulators to lay off. They cannot even afford counsel to defend them in
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. The five justices that made up the majority in Furman concluded that
the death penalty was being imposed so discriminatorily, Furman, 408 U.S.
at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), id. at
364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring), so arbitrarily, id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), and so infrequently, id. at 310
(White, J., concurring), that any given death sentence was cruel and unusual.
Justice Brennan also concluded that because "the deliberate extinguishment of
human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity" it is
inconsistent with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Id. at 270, 291.
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cases where their lives are at stake. They must take the lawyers assigned to
them. When these persons face society's ultimate punishment, does the
process include the fundamental procedural safeguards which ensure that the
issues of guilt and punishment are fairly and reliably determined?
It is appropriate as well to address these questions at a lecture made
possible by Mortimer A. Rosecan, one of the distinguished alumni of this law
school and someone who represents the best of the legal profession: an
outstanding litigator, a tremendously accomplished lawyer, but one who
always responded when the court or the priest called upon him to help those
unable to afford legal representation.
On one such occasion many years ago, Morty was asked by Father
Dismas Clark to take the case of a person facing the death penalty. The priest
said he had prayed on it, and the Lord had told him to come to Morty to ask
him to provide representation for a person just hours away from execution.
Of course no money was involved, but Morty took the case, obtained a stay
of execution and later a commutation of the death sentence to life imprison-
ment.4
To answer the questions I have raised, we need to examine how the death
penalty has been inflicted in the past and the reality of its use today. As I
3. The fundamental procedural safeguards, protected by the Bill of
Rights, include the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and a fair and impartial jury, the
Eighth Amendment protection against the imposition of an arbitrary,
capricious or excessive sentence, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to be
indicted and tried by juries from which persons were not excluded on the basis
of race. Most fundamental of all these safeguards is the right to counsel for
without adequate legal representation an accused is helpless to avail himself
of the other protections.
4. The person he represented was Marcus Goodwin, who was scheduled
to be executed on February 23, 1962. State v. Goodwin, 352 S.W.2d 614
(Mo.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 915 (1962). After taking the case, Morty
Rosecan obtained a stay of execution on February 21 from Missouri Governor
John Dalton. On March 27, 1962, the Governor commuted the sentence to
life imprisonment. The contention that Goodwin was denied effective
assistance of counsel and was insane at the time of the crime and at the time
statements were obtained from him was rejected by the Missouri courts, In re
Goodwin, 359 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 915 (1962), but
Goodwin later obtained federal habeas corpus relief. Goodwin v. Swenson,
287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968). He was represented in federal court by
Professor Edward H. Hunvald, Jr., of this law school, who has made immense
contributions to the development of the criminal law and improvement of
criminal lawyers in this state.
1992]
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said, the death penalty was struck down twenty years ago. Almost immediate-
ly Georgia, Texas, Florida and other states enacted new death penalty statutes.
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld some of those statutes. 5 Thirty-six states,
the United States, and the military now have death penalty laws.6 The rest
of the world is moving away from capital punishment. Most of the European
countries have done away with it.7 South Africa has even suspended the
death penalty.' Apart from the states in this country that favor the death
penalty, it has its greatest popularity in China and Iran.9
Just over twenty-five of the states in the United States use the death
penalty with some frequency. Two states, New Hampshire and South Dakota,
have it on the books but have never imposed it.10 Other states, like Colora-
do, have imposed death infrequently and have only a few persons under death
sentence. Other states have death rows with hundreds waiting to be gassed,
electrocuted, hanged, shot or injected. Twenty-five hundred people are on
death row in our country today; 161 people have been executed, the most
recent, last Monday night in Texas." Today, as was the case before
Furman, the death penalty has its greatest popularity south of the Mason-
5. The Court upheld the statutes enacted by Florida, Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976), Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
Texas, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, (1976), and struck down the statutes
adopted by North Carolina, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
and Louisiana, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The first execution
after the Supreme Court allowed the resumption of capital punishment was in
1977, when Gary Gilmore was killed by a firing squad in Utah.
6. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Death Row USA, Spring
1992, at 1.
7. Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty; List ofAbolitionist and Retentionist
Countries, Dec. 1991 (issued February 1992 by International Secretariat of
Amnesty International, 1 Easton Street, London WCIX 8DJ, United Kingdom).
The death penalty has been abolished in England, France, Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg, Romania, Spain and
Switzerland. Id.
8. Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty News, Feb. 1992, at 4.
9. These two countries alone accounted for 89% of all executions
recorded in 1991 by Amnesty International. The organization reported 2,086
prisoners known to have been executed in 32 countries. It recorded 1,084
executions in China and 775 in Iran, but the true figures are believed to be
much higher. Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty News, Apr. 1992, at 3.
10. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra note 6, at 1.
11. Johnny Frank Garrett was executed in Texas on February 11, 1992.
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Dixon line. It is the Southern states which have the largest death rows and
have carried out most of the executions.
Missouri has the death penalty. Your state has seventy-three persons
under death sentence. It has carried out five executions. Missouri is perhaps
best known in national capital punishment jurisprudence for Wilkins v.
Missouri,12 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
executing juveniles. This is perhaps not one of the things which causes
Missourians to swell with pride. Even Libya does not allow the execution of
juveniles, but Missouri does, and some other states do as well.
It is remarkable how much the modern history of the death penalty in
these last nineteen years reflects the same characteristics of the first 200
hundred years of its use. It is important for us to be in touch with our history
and see how that history has an impact on what is going on today in our
courts.
Throughout our nation's history, the death penalty has been most popular
in the South. When Furman came down twenty years ago, Florida had the
most people on death row. Texas, which has a long history of use of the
death penalty, has recently overtaken Florida for the dubious distinction of
having the largest death row. Texas has 349 under sentence of death;
Florida's death row of 315 is now second largest. 3 Since 1976, several
Southern states with less than twenty percent of the country's population have
carried out over ninety percent of the executions. By the time of Furman,
Georgia was known as the nation's executioner, the state which carried out the
most executions. Between 1924 and the Furman decision in 1972, Georgia
executed 337 black people and only seventy-five white people.14 Under its
new death penalty law, Georgia has carried out fifteen executions, eleven of
African Americans, only four of white persons-almost the same pattern that
we saw before. 5 Nearby, Alabama has carried out eight executions. Six of
the eight people who have been executed were African Americans. 6
History is also reflected in the role that the race and class of the victims
of crime play in the use of the death penalty. Although African Americans
12. The case was consolidated with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989).
13. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra note 6, at 14, 31.
14. Prentice Palmer & Jim Galloway, Georgia Electric Chair Spans 5
Decades, ATLANTA J., Dec. 15, 1983, at 15A. After adopting electrocution
as a means of execution in 1924, Georgia put more people to death than any
state and "set national records for executions over a 20-year period in the
1940s and 1950s." Id.
15. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra note 6, at 5-8.
16. Id.
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make up only twelve percent of the total population, black citizens have been
the victims in about half of the total homicides in this country in the last
twenty-five years. 17 In the death belt states of the South, African Americans
are the victims of over sixty percent of all the murders. Yet eighty-four
percent of the cases, in which the death penalty has been carried out, have
involved white victims.18
In Georgia, for example, although African Americans were the victims
of 63.5 percent of the murders between 1976 and 1980, eighty-five percent of
the cases, in which death was imposed during that period, involved murders
of whites." Two sophisticated statistical studies of over 2,000 murder cases
that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s found that prosecutors are more
likely to seek the death penalty where the victim is white and juries are more
likely to impose the death penalty in such cases.20 This pattern is not limited
to Georgia.21 An analysis by the United States General Accounting Office
of twenty-eight studies of the death penalty in Georgia and elsewhere found
that murders of white persons are more likely to be punished by death than
murders of black persons.22
17. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCE-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 382, table 3.124 (1990). Black
persons were the victims of 49% of the murders in 1989, the most recent of
the 26 years listed, and white persons were the victims in 48%. Id.
18. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra note 6, at 4.
19. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 43-44 (1989).
20. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). Defendants
charged with murders of white persons received the death penalty in 11% of
the cases, while defendants charged with murders of blacks received the death
penalty in only one percent of the cases. Id. at 286. The studies concluded
that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely
to receive death sentences than defendants charged with killing blacks. Id. at
287. See also DAVID C. BALDUS Er AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY; A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
21. See, e.g., GROSS & MAURO, supra note 19, at 88-94 (in Florida, those
who kill whites are almost eight times as likely to be sentenced to death as
those who kill blacks; in Illinois the ratio is six to one; in Mississippi 5.5 to
one; and in North Carolina four to one).
22. The General Accounting Office reported:
In 82 percent of the studies, race of the victim was found to
influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or
receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were
found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who
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What we see in these patterns is a continuation of the influence that race
has had on the severity of punishment throughout our history. Georgia and
other states for many years had laws which punished crimes differently based
upon the race of the victim and the race of the defendant. For example, the
crime of rape was automatically punished by death if it involved a black
defendant and a white victim, but the same crime by a white person against
a black was often punished by a fine or imprisonment?23 Those laws are no
longer on the books, but we still see in practice that white lives are valued
over black lives as was once mandated by law.
Other historic practices and purposes of capital punishment are also still
with us today. Many of you are familiar with the case of the "Scottsboro
boys," which resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Ala-
bama,24 which established the right of an indigent defendant to be represent-
ed by counsel in a capital case. But there is much more you should know
about the prosecution of those nine black youths for the alleged rape of two
white girls, which is set out in an excellent book, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of
the American South?3 It describes not only many injustices of the prosecu-
tion of those cases, but also how in the 1930s, when the South was getting
such a bad press for lynching people, the perfunctory death penalty trial
emerged as a substitute for lynching. Instead of lynching people on the
courthouse square, which happened even as late as the 1940s and 1950s in the
South, the accused was taken to the court and given a quick, perfunctory trial
where everyone knew that the sentence would be death. This ensured the
desired result, but avoided the unseemly exercise of lynching people without
trials. 6
murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across
data sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATIERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (Feb. 1990).
23. This history is recounted in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329-30 (1987). See also A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS 253-56 (1978).
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979).
26. See also RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "SCOTrSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIP-
Pi: THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V. MississiPPi (1986); GEORGE C.
WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB
RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) (describing how "legal lynchings"
achieved through perfunctory capital trials replaced mob lynching in
1992]
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The perfunctory capital trial is not ancient history. The capital trial of
David Peek started at 9:00 a.m. on July 28, 1976, in Greene County, Georgia,
and ended seventeen hours later with a sentence of death. Jury deliberations
on the issue of guilt started at 10:30 p.m. At half past midnight, the foreman
of the jury asked the judge to remove the one juror who was holding out for
a verdict of "not guilty." The court-appointed lawyer for the accused agreed
to substitution of another juror. Just three minutes after the new juror entered
the jury room, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty." Despite the hour, the
separate penalty phase of the trial then started. By 2 a.m., David Peek had
been sentenced to death. 7 Many post-Furman capital trials have taken as
little as one, two or three days.
Nor has invidious discrimination on the basis of race been eradicated
from modern death penalty practice. In Chambers County, Alabama, the
prosecutor divided up the prospective jurors for a capital trial into four
different lists: "strong," "medium," "weak" and "black." He then used all his
jury strikes to eliminate all the black citizens from jury service. As a result,
Albert Jefferson, a mentally retarded African American accused of a crime
against a white person, was tried by three all-white juries.2 The prosecutor
used a total of twenty-six jury strikes against African Americans to obtain that
result. Albert Jefferson is under death sentence today.
Joseph Briley, a prosecutor in Georgia, has tried thirty-one death penalty
cases in his tenure as District Attorney. Of those thirty-one cases, twenty-four
had African American defendants. In the cases in which the defendants were
black and the victims were white, he used ninety-four percent of his jury
challenges-96 out of 103-against black citizens.29  Once, he instructed
Kentucky).
27. Peek's conviction was originally reversed due to the juror substitution
by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Peek v. Kemp,
746 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1984). However, the panel opinion was vacated and
the court, sitting en banc, upheld Peek's conviction and sentence. Peek v.
Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
The facts set out in the text are taken from the panel opinion, Peek 1, 746 F.2d
at 673-76, and Judge Frank Johnson's dissent from the en banc opinion, Peek
1I, 784 F.2d at 1504-05 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
28. The first trial was held in 1983 to determine Jefferson's mental
competency to stand trial. The second was his guilt and penalty trial in 1983,
and the third was a resentencing trial in 1984. State v. Jefferson, Cir. Ct. of
Chambers Co., Ala., No. CC-81-77.
29. Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. "991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992).
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jury commissioners in one county to underrepresent black citizens on the
master jury lists from which grand and trial juries were selected.3
Quite often the number of minority jurors in a venire for a capital trial
is less than the number of peremptory jury strikes allowed the prosecutor.
When a prosecutor uses the overwhelming majority of his jury strikes against
a small racial minority, that minority is prohibited from participating in the
process. A jury does not represent "the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death,"31 when one fourth or more of the
community is not represented on it.
As a result of these and other discriminatory practices, the capital trials
we see in the South today look much like the trials that we saw before
Furman. Often the only African American participating in the process is the
person who is on trial. Everyone else-the prosecutor, the judge, the defense
lawyers, the jurors-is white. Much of this history and much of the reality
of how the death penalty is used today is unknown, forgotten or denied by
most citizens and members of the legal profession.
The reality became known to me for the first time thirteen years ago
when I was asked to prepare a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court for an eighteen-year old black youth who had been sentenced
to death in Georgia. At the time, I was the director of a law school clinical
program in Washington, D.C. I will never forget the record of that case that
came to me. It was a little over an inch thick. That included everything-the
motions, the voir dire, the trial, and the sentencing phase. I called the person
who had asked me to take the case and said, "Surely this cannot be the record
of a capital trial."
Like most people in the country, I had assumed that the imposition of the
death penalty was surrounded by elaborate procedural protections; that no one
could be sentenced to death in some perfunctory process; and that those facing
the ultimate penalty received the best legal representation and the most careful
trial procedure.
I read that record that night. It only took a short time. I commented to
a colleague the next day that the law students in our clinic tried shoplifting
cases better than this capital case had been tried; however, I did not know
everything then. I did not know from the record that my new client was
schizophrenic, and that he was out of touch with reality during his trial. The
jury that sentenced him to die was never told that he was afflicted with this
major mental illness. It was never told about other things we learned later,
30. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
31. Witherspoon v. Illionis, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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such as the abuse he had suffered growing up disabled in a dysfunctional
family of alcoholics.32
The court-appointed defense lawyer in that case did a terrible job. He
gave no opening statement, he did not ask many questions, he did not make
many objections, and he did not put on evidence to seek to avoid the death
penalty. The jury that sentenced that youth to die was not even told that he
suffered from schizophrenia. But, as I look back on what I have seen since,
I realize that poor persons facing the death penalty often receive far worse
representation.
A woman, who was tried in Alabama for the murder of a man who had
abused her and her children for fifteen years, was represented by two court-
appointed lawyers. One came to court during trial so intoxicated that the
judge had to stop the trial for a day and send the lawyer to jail. The next
morning, both the defendant and the defense lawyer were produced from jail
and the trial resumed. A few days later she was sentenced to death.33 The
jury never knew the full story of the abuse she had suffered because the
lawyer did not find before trial medical records that would have corroborated
her -testimony and the testimony of-her daughter about the broken bones they
had suffered at the hands of the husband.
Another young man sentenced to death in Alabama grew up in the kind
of poverty we try to pretend does not exist in America today. His father was
mentally retarded. His mother died when he was four. He and eight brothers
and sisters grew up in a two-room shack with no electricity or running water.
When it rained at night, the children had to put plastic over the beds because
rain came right through the ceiling. They would all get in beds together and
huddle up under the plastic while it rained.
This young man is mentally retarded. His IQ is only fifty-eight. He is
the only person I have known who flunked the first grade twice. But nothing
about his limitations or deprivation was presented to the judge who sentenced
him to die. His lawyer even got him to waive a jury sentencing and let the
judge sentence him to death.'
Another mentally retarded offender, Horace Dunkins, was executed in
1989 in Alabama. A person who had served as a juror at his trial, upon
reading about Dunkins' retardation immediately before he was to be executed,
32. Ultimately, the death sentence was set aside on federal habeas corpus
review because of the failure of the lawyer to put on any evidence in
mitigation. Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 996 (1986).
33. Record, State v. Haney, Ala. Ct. Crim. App. No. 7 Div. 148, at 846-
49.
34. Motion for New Trial and Appendices, Luke v. Thigpen, No. 84-T-
1567-E, (M.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 1989).
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attempted to contact the governor of Alabama, saying she would never have
voted for the death penalty if she had known of his mental limitations."
In another case tried in Mississippi, a person was represented at a capital
trial by a public defender and a third year law student. Over half of the
witnesses at that trial were examined by the third year law student, who told
the judge at one point that she needed some time, because she had never been
in court before.36 There have been other cases in which the lawyer's first
trial after law school was a capital trial.
37
A lawyer, who has tried a number of death penalty cases in Georgia, was
testifying not long ago and was asked about some of the leading Georgia
capital cases, including Furman, which struck down Georgia's death penalty
law, and Gregg v. Georgia,38 which upheld the new statute.39 He was not
familiar with either one. He was asked to name any criminal law decisions
from any court-the Supreme Court of the United States, the Georgia
Supreme Court, any court in the country-that he knew. He answered, "Well,
we've got the Miranda case. Everybody knows the Miranda case."40 Asked
to recall any others, he could only name the case in which he was testifying
and "the Dred Scott case."41 Those were the only "criminal" cases that he
could name.
One would think that surely such a lawyer could not render effective
assistance in a capital case or any other type of criminal case. Yet courts
have held in two capital cases that the representation he provided was
35. Peter Applebome, Two Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1989, at A6.
36. Trial Transcript, State v. Leatherwood, Miss. S. Ct. No. DP-70, rev'd.
on other grounds, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
37. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987)
(defendant represented by lawyer who had been member of the bar eight
weeks when case tried); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 832 (1985) (defendant represented by an attorney who had
been admitted to the bar just a few months before trial); Bell v. Watkins, 692
F.2d 999, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983) (defendant
represented by attorney who had recently graduated from law school and never
tried a criminal case all the way to verdict).
38. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
39. Transcript of testimony of O.L. Collins at hearing of April 25-27,
1988, State v. Birt, Sup. Ct. of Jefferson Co., Ga. No 2360, at 230-31.
40. Id. at 231 (referring to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
41. Id. Of course, Dred Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
was not a criminal case.
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adequate.42 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington43 has, in application in the lower courts, resulted in a Sixth
Amendment standard of representation that is little more than "close enough
for government work." As observed by former Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall, "all manner of negligence, ineptitude, and even callous
disregard for the client" pass muster under Strickland.' There are more
examples of what Justice Marshall described than I can share with you, but
I would like to describe a few which demonstrate that the protections of the
Bill of Rights are often missing from the process of imposing death because
of deficiencies in the quality of legal representation.
The only time the court-appointed lawyer ever referred to George Dungee
at his capital trial was in the closing argument when he called him a "little
138-pound nigger man."45 This is one of four Georgia cases I am aware of,
in which defense lawyers referred to their own clients with this racial slur
during the trial. If Dungee's attorney had ever done any investigation, he
would have found that his client was profoundly mentally retarded. He could
not write his name, drive a car or make change.
Just a short time after John Young was sentenced to death in Macon,
Georgia, he met his defense lawyer on the yard at the jail. The lawyer had
been arrested on state and federal drug charges. The lawyer later said that he
42. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 596-601, 603-05 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Williams v. State, 368 S.E.2d 742, 747-50
(1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). In Birt, the dissent would have
found the attorney ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge jury
pools that were unconstitutionally composed. Birt, 725 F.2d at 603-05
(Hatchett, J., dissenting). However, because the majority concluded that the
attorney was not ineffective, Birt's conviction was upheld even though the
jury which convicted him was drawn from a jury pool in which black people
and women were unconstitutionally underrepresented.
43. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In adopting a Sixth Amendment standard of
effective assistance of counsel in Strickland, the Court held that deference was
to be paid to the performance of counsel and a conviction set aside only if the
defendant could demonstrate that his lawyer "made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment" and that these deficiencies resulted in "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would be different." Id. at 694.
44. Remarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Judicial
Conference, Sept. 1988, at 6.
45. Record Excerpts, Dungee v. Kemp, No. 85-8202 (11th Cir.), at 102
(transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments in State v. Dungee at 39).
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was under considerable stress during John Young's trial. He was on drugs.
He was breaking up with his wife. He was breaking with his gay lover. He
really was not focused on the trial. 46 But this was close enough for govern-
ment work. John Young was executed in 1985.
The first person executed in Georgia after the resumption of capital
punishment was a person named John Eldon Smith. Because his lawyer was
not aware of the case from the United States Supreme Court holding that
juries must fairly represent women,47 he did not object to the exclusion of
women from the jury pool from which John Smith's jury was selected. The
lawyer for John Smith's co-defendant knew about the case and raised the
issue. Nevertheless, the elected state judge overruled the objection. In
separate trials, both Smith and his co-defendant were sentenced to death.
When the two cases were reviewed in federal court, the co-defendant won
a new trial because the exclusion of women from the jury violated the
Constitution of the United States.4 At a new trial before a jury that
represented the community, a life sentence was returned. John Eldon Smith
was sentenced to death by a jury chosen out of that same jury pool from
which women were excluded. But his lawyer had not raised the point. The
federal courts refused to consider the issue.4 9 He was executed.
If you switched the lawyers in these two cases, you would change the
outcomes. If Smith had been represented by the co-defendant's lawyer and
vice-versa, Smith would be alive today. The co-defendant would be dead.
Once again, we see history repeating itself. In his opinion in Furman, Justice
Douglas, in showing how the death penalty had been randomly applied,
pointed to an instance where one person was saved from execution because
his attorney made timely objection to the jury selection system while another
person was sent to his death by a jury selected in precisely the same system
because his lawyer did not raise the issue.50
Is this a principled way to decide who should die? Yet often whether
someone receives the death penalty is determined not by whether he
committed the worst crime, but whether he was assigned the worst lawyer at
trial.
46. Young v. Kemp, Civ. No. 85-98-2MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985) (affidavit
of Charles Marchman, Jr.).
47. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
48. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1127 (1983).
49. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir.) (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
50. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 n.21 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Larry Heath is scheduled to be executed by the state of Alabama, on
March 20.5' The brief filed by his court-appointed attorney on direct appeal
to the Alabama Supreme Court contained only one page of argument. It
raised one issue. It cited one case.5 2 The lawyer did not even show up for
oral argument. This "brief' would not have received a passing grade in a
first-year legal writing class. It should not have been filed in even the most
minor case. But in a capital case in Alabama, it was close enough for
government work.
Such shameful representation is pervasive in capital punishment cases s3
and in other cases involving poor people charged with crimes.54 Why is this
allowed to go on in our courts? Why would any conscientious judge, why
would any bar association, why would any system that is supposed to dispense
justice ever allow these kinds of things to happen?
51. The execution was carried out on that day.
52. Brief and Argument in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
State v. Heath, Ala. S. Ct. #82-1060.
53. The "inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at trial" has
been described as one of the "principal failings" of the capital punishment
system today. American Bar Ass'n, Toward a More Just and Effective System
of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 16 (1990). The
National Law Journal, after an extensive study of capital cases in six Southern
states, found that "justice in capital murder trials is more like a random flip
of the coin than a delicate balancing of the scales" because the defense lawyer
"too often is ill-trained, unprepared and grossly underpaid." Marcia Coyle et
al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J.,
June 11, 1990, at 1. See also Kathryn Kahler, Newhouse News Service,
Death Row Defendants Given Inferior Lawyers, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE,
May 13, 1990, at pages Al, A8; Kathryn Kahler, Newhouse News Service,
Mercy Short as Money for Death Row's Poor, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE,
May 14, 1990, at A6; Anthony Lewis, Crime Is Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1990, at A21; Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at
the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(1986); Tom Wicker, Defending the Indigent in Capital Cases, 3 CRIM.
JUSTICE EThics 2 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Study Faults Atlanta's System of
Defending the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.:30, 1990, at B5; Stacey Colino, When
Justice Goes Begging, A.B.A. STUDENT LAW. MAG., Oct. 1988, at 14; Hal
Straus, Indigent Legal Defense Called 'Terrible,' ATLANTA J. & CONST., July
7, 1985, at Al.
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There are a number of reasons. Some, such as the lack of public
defender programs and inadequate funding for indigent defense programs,
55
I will not discuss here today. But I would like to address several factors
which are interrelated. Some of them have to do with how we decide to
practice our craft when we become lawyers.
One reason is the refusal of lawyers and the criminal courts to acknowl-
edge and deal with the way in which antagonisms between people of different
races influence decisions in the court system. Racial prejudice and the
exclusion of minorities from participation in the process is the determinative
factor in many cases, capital and non-capital. Often issues involving racial
discrimination are summarily swept aside by courts based upon the Supreme
Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp. 6 There is little recognition of the
55. Many states still do not have comprehensive public defender
programs and instead appoint lawyers to defend capital cases. The old adage,
you get what you pay for, clearly applies to attracting lawyers to defend poor
persons in complex cases. In many Southern states' it is difficult to find any
type of legal work that pays less than defending a person in a capital case.
For example, Alabama limits compensation for out-of-court preparation to $20
per hour up to a limit of $2,000 for a capital case. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d)
(Supp. 1989). South Carolina pays $10 per hour for time spent out of court
and $15 per hour for time spent in court up to a limit of $5,000 for the total
fee for two attorneys appointed. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-3-50, 16-3-26(B)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991). It is completely unrealistic to expect
capable and experienced attorneys to defend cases at these rates of compensa-
tion.
56. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, the Supreme Court concluded,
by a vote of 5-4, that a pattern of significant racial disparities in the
imposition of the death penalty throughout Georgia did not establish a
constitutional violation. Among other things, the evidence in McCleskey
established that "prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black
defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims." Id. at 287. Some courts have held that
McCleskey forecloses inquiry into the influence of racial discrimination on a
defendant's sentence. See, e.g., Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 318 (11th
Cir. 1991); Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990). However, McCleskey holds that, while
evidence of a state-wide pattern is insufficient, a defendant may prevail if he
presents evidence which establishes "that the decisionmakers if his case acted
or intend to act with discriminatory purpose." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
Thus, even under McCleskey, a defendant may show that the decision to seek
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urgency with which we must ensure full participation by minorities in the
criminal justice system and adopt procedures to identify and eliminate racial
prejudice by decision-makers.
Another reason the injustices I have described are tolerated is that courts
do not function well when they are caught up in the passions and politics of
the moment. And no case involves the passions of the moment more than a
death penalty case, particularly one involving an interracial crime. Defending
a poor person accused of a crime will usually be bad for a lawyer's business,
but prosecuting or presiding over a celebrated murder case is almost always
good for a prosecutor's or judge's political career. Often a capital prosecution
is serving political purposes and not the goals of law enforcement or justice.
Another factor is that we are isolating ourselves from our history and the
reality of what is going on in our society today. We have learned so well
how to do this in the last ten years. A lot of people would like to believe that
the problem of racial discrimination just ended all of a sudden in 1964, 1970
or whenever; that the relationship between the races is perfect today; or that
the only problem is affirmative action programs.
Yet the President was elected by exploiting the Willie Horton advertise-
ments that played on racial fears. His party has convinced many white people
that all of their problems-from finding employment to threats to their
standard of living-are attributable to our society's recent efforts to make up
for 200 years of brutal racial discrimination. Americans continue to move to
racially exclusive neighborhoods, join racially exclusive private clubs and send
their children to private schools, but say that there is not a problem with
regard to race. David Duke, an unrepentant racist, won fifty-five percent of
the white vote in the recent election for governor of Louisiana, and people
deny that there is racial prejudice.
The racial biases in our society are clearly felt in the courtroom. The
people who voted for David Duke are sitting on juries in Louisiana, and,
undoubtedly, some of them are prosecuting or judging those cases. Racial
biases are particularly evident in the selection of cases for capital prosecution.
Most murders in our society are intraracial. Murders of white people are by
other white people, and murders of African Americans are usually by black
people. Comparatively, there are few interracial crimes. Yet those are the
crimes that are most likely to result in the death penalty. Georgia prosecutors
seek the death penalty in seventy percent of the cases involving black
defendants and white victims, but in less than thirty-five percent of cases
involving all other racial combinations." Georgia has executed fifteen
the death penalty in his case is based on racial considerations by his
prosecutor or other decision-makers in the case.
57. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
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people. Ten of those were black people executed for crimes against whites.
The criminal justice systems in our nation are the institutions least
affected by America's civil rights movement. In one community after another,
even those with substantial minority populations, the courts are made up of
judges who are white, prosecutors who are white, and jurors who are white.
We tolerate racial discrimination in the court system that we do not
tolerate in any other area of American life today. In a recent Florida case, the
judge referred to the defendant's parents as the "nigger mom and dad."58 If
that judge had been a sportscaster with CBS, he would have lost his job. But
all that the Florida Supreme Court said in response to this incident was to
emphasize "the need for all judges to be constantly vigilant about their
comments and demeanor both inside and outside the courtroom to assure that
their impartiality may not 'reasonably be questioned."'5 9 In short, a judge
who keeps his racial prejudice to himself may preside over capital trials in
Florida today.
Wiley Dobbs was sentenced to death in Georgia at a trial where was
referred to as "colored" and "colored boy" by the judge and defense lawyer
and called by his first name by the prosecutor.6
The District Attorney in Jackson, Mississippi, Ed Peters, admitted under
oath, that it was his practice in selecting a jury to "get rid of" as many black
people as he can.61 In what other area of American life could a public
official have a policy like that and get away with it?
If an educational institution or housing authority selected applicants like
the prosecutor selected a capital jury in Chambers County, Alabama, by
dividing them into "weak," "medium," "strong" and "black" and excluding all
the African Americans first, does anyone doubt that it would not be allowed?
But a prosecutor is permitted to select a jury for a capital trial that way.
The passions of the moment often contribute to the tolerance of racial
discrimination in these cases.' I was in a court not long ago, where a district
attorney was justifying his use of nine of his ten peremptory strikes against
African Americans.6' He gave reasons for each strike and, after each one,
an assistant district attorney would ask whether race was a part of the reason
he struck that juror. The District Attorney would solemnly answer that it was
not.
58. Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986).
59. Id. (citation omitted).
60. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 963
F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991).
61. Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1059 (1989).
62. The prosecutor was required to give reasons for his strikes under the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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He knew-he was lying. We knew he was lying. The judge knew he was
lying. The judge was a foraer prosecutor himself. He used to strike all the
African Americans when he picked juries; he knew the game. Yet he put on
blinders and pretended that the answers were true. It was not a court of
justice; it was a court of vengeance. That is what the death penalty is doing
to a lot of our courts. Their purpose is to serve interests of vengeance, not
justice. Many state courts in the South have never had sufficient commitment
to the interests of justice. The death penalty is pushing them even further
away from the goal of justice. When courts are not dispensing justice but
vengeance, it has an effect on all of us. Everyone-the bar, lawyers, even the
press-tends to look the other way when the purpose of justice is subverted.
People got very comfortable during President Reagan's administration in
pretending that a typical example of poverty in America was a welfare queen
in Chicago who drove a Cadillac and collected too many welfare checks.
That was a great escape, but it was not the reality of what was going on in
our world. It is easier to pretend that our courts are dispensing justice than
to recognize how difficult some of these problems are and how unpleasant it
is to deal with them. But we are going to have to do that if we are going to
have a better world.
Increasingly, the wealthy, the professionals, those in government and
others with power and influence in our society are losing touch with poor
people and the reality of life for them. Many lawyers live in exclusive
neighborhoods. They drive to work hermetically sealed in their luxury cars
on expressways that take them over the neighborhoods where the poor live.
They drive into their private parking buildings and take private elevators to
their offices. They never have any contact with or get to know the poor,
memlbers of other races, the homeless, the disadvantaged, the mentally ill.
They do not know the reality of what life is like for those unlike themselves.
Not long ago a lawyer told me that homeless people want to be homeless;
that a lot of homeless people are making a lot of money and just living on the
streets and begging because it is a good way to make money; and that
everyone in this country who wants a job can have one. This lawyer, who has
probably never met a homeless person, was very secure in these beliefs. A
teacher at a segregation academy 63 in Forsyth, Georgia, told me recently that
63. After the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required the
abolition of dual school systems segregated by race in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "there arose in the South a new type of
private school, popularly called the 'segregation academy.' ... [T]hese
completely segregated schools have one common characteristic: they were
created to avoid the desegregation mandate of Brown and its progeny." Note,
Desegregation of Private Schools, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1971).
Between 1967 and 1970, as the public schools in Georgia were desegregated,
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his students think that people are homeless because they have done something
morally wrong.
These beliefs have no relation to the reality of life for homeless people
in our society. My office is in downtown Atlanta in a little row of buildings
where three of the five are vacant and abandoned. I know a, great many
homeless people. I see them at night as I walk down the street. I see them
going through the garbage bags from the fast food restaurants, picking out
little pieces of hamburgers and fish sandwiches to eat. I see them talking to
people who are not there and hearing voices that the rest of us do not hear.
My good friend, Ronnie Fortson, shines shoes for a dollar a pair on the streets
of Atlanta. He is homeless. He has been arrested eight times for shining
shoes without a license. He tries to make an honest dollar so that he can
afford a room for the night. We found it would cost him $171 to get a shoe
shining permit, but it did not matter how much it cost because there was a
freeze on. He could not have had a shoe shining permit anyway. This is an
example of the high cost of getting out of poverty. It is a cost many of the
homeless cannot afford.
We have blinded ourselves to the reality that many people in this society
are denied opportunity. There are children in schools who are not learning to
read, not because they do not want to or are incapable of learning, but because
of our abandonment of the public schools. They are not only being denied an
education, they are being denied any chance for meaningful employment later
in life.
We ignore the reality that there are other people in our society who
through no fault or choice on their part are simply not able to function on the
same level as the rest of us. There are people with limited intellectual
the number of private schools in Georgia increased from eighty to 224, a
180% increase, and the number of students in private schools increased 400%.
Anthony M. Champagne, The Segregation Academy and the Law, 42 J. OF
NEGRO EDUc. 58, 60 n.8 (Winter 1973). These "segregated private schools
have become the new vehicle for evading the principle of integrated
education," id. at 58, and have resulted in "a resegregation that has divided
education between private academies for whites and public schools too poor
to make a difference for blacks." Jim Auchmutey & Priscilla Painton, Stigma
Haunts Black Belt like a Bad Dream, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 16, 1986,
at 1A, 16A. Of course, the creation and maintenance of these schools for the
last twenty years by white Southerners demonstrates the depth of their racial
animus. Such extraordinary efforts to perpetuate separation of the races sets
an unmistakable example for children which helps keep alive racial prejudice
in new generations. In addition, the lack of interaction with people of other
races leaves children without experiences which would contradict the
suggestion that those who are different are inferior and to be feared.
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functioning of varying degrees. There are other people with serious mental
impairments, who can no longer get the treatment and supervision that is
required because so many of the programs have been cut back. Some of these
people-again through no fault of their own-are without families or other
support. They need our help.
And we continue to ignore the foolhardiness of the easy availability of
guns, which means that any of those people can go in and exercise their
exalted right to bear arms, as they do occasionally with tragic results. A
recently released mental patient walked into a mall in Atlanta and starting
shooting everybody who was there. In Columbus, Georgia, a person walked
into a police station at midday and shot one of the policemen dead and
wounded another. He was a paranoid schizophrenic who believed the police
were in a conspiracy with his former employers to get him. Prosecutors spent
a lot of that community's money seeking the death penalty in that case. We
must deal with the realities behind these tragedies. Killing such people after
the crime is not going to make us any safer when we walk down the streets.
We are denying or ignoring these and other important realities and
focusing on our own individual well being. Most tragically, whether the
American Dream is being realized is defined today by the questions: Are we
better off than we used to be? Will the next generation live better than the
last generation? Will we live better than our parents, and will our children
live even better than we live? The cover of Fortune Magazine on sale today
at the newsstands says that the question for this year's election is the one that
President Reagan posed when he ran in 1980: Are you better off than you
were four years ago?
I submit we are asking the wrong question. The questions we should be
asking are:
Are the hungry being fed?
Are the sick being treated?
Are the schools educating our children?
Are the courts dispensing justice?
Are we gaining in our struggle to end racial discrimination?
How do we eliminate poverty and homelessness from our society in the
shortest possible time frame?
Certainly, we as citizens should press the candidates and our governments
for the answers to these questions. But regardless of whether the larger
society decides to ignore or confront these problems, those of us in the legal
profession have the privilege of being able to do something as individuals
about these problems. But to do that, we must get away from the notion that
we are going to go where the money is and not where the problems are.
There is something fundamentally wrong with a legal system in which the
Bank of Commerce.and Credit International (BCCI) can hire former Secretary
of Defense Clark Clifford to deal with the government or E.F. Hutton can hire
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former Attorney General Griffin Bell for $1700 per hour to do a white-
wash,6 but a person facing the death penalty is often assigned a lawyer that
you or I would not have represent us in a minor traffic matter. There is
something fundamentally wrong with our legal system when people facing the
death penalty are being represented by lawyers whose total knowledge of the
law is a vague familiarity with Miranda and Dred Scott.
Something is grievously amiss in the United States when the Justice
Department spends a substantial amount of its energy and resources devising
ways to speed up the process of executing poor people without regard to the
racial discrimination, the inadequacy of counsel, and the influence of politics
and the passions of the moment on the process, but drags its feet in investigat-
ing the savings and loan scandal, police brutality in Los Angeles, and so many
other urgent national problems.
Lawyers must decide whether their allegiance is to certain principles or
material wealth. If you ask people whom they admire the most, Mother
Teresa or Imelda Marcos, most people will'say Mother Teresa. Yet in the
legal profession it seems that many of us are trying to emulate Imelda Marcos.
Everywhere one looks in the profession, one sees the trappings of wealth: the
Porsches, the car phones, the summer homes, and the Rolex watches. Robert
Altman, one of the lawyers who represented BCCI, has twenty-three
bathrooms in his house. There are people living on the street with no home
at all. Yet many in the legal profession have developed a sense that such
ridiculously extravagant life styles are a part of what being a lawyer is all
about; that these are the rewards of success in the profession; and that there
is something wrong with the lawyers who make a modest living and live a
modest lifestyle.
As a member of the legal profession, I was embarrassed by the way in
which the president of the American Bar Association was ridiculed after he
asserted that lawyers were defending the downtrodden and the poor in
response to criticism of our profession by Vice President Dan Quayle. One
commentator said that the only time the president of the ABA has seen a poor
person was when he came to take his trash out. This criticism may have been
unfair, but it is a telling comment about how people see our profession.
As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., pointed out, we are prone to judge
success by the index of our salaries or the size of our automobiles, rather than
by the quality of our service and relationship to humanity. That must change.
Elie Wiesel said, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, "Our lives
no longer belong to us alone; they belong to all those who need us desperate-
ly. i,6
64. Bell Earned $1,711 an Hour in E.F. Hutton Probe, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 1, 1987, at B10.
65. Wiesel's Speech: This Honor Belongs to All the Survivors, N.Y.
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I have not had enough time here today to describe adequately the urgency
and desperation of the need that poor, minority and disadvantaged people have
in this country for adequate legal representation. But I hope that I have at
least alerted you to the need for lawyers who will commit not just a few years
to learn at the expense of the poor, but who will commit a lifetime to legal
services, public defender and other programs where they can help the poor of
this country get through this dark midnight of greed and selfishness and
indifference that has taken over our country.
I do not suggest for one minute that it is an easy road. It is not. The
workload is overwhelming because there are not enough people who will
respond to the need. The hours are often long. The sorrows are many. But
if you do not respond, it may very well be that no one else will either. And
the Bill of Rights may remain unavailable to those who most need its
protections.
As you consider this, I leave with you a thought by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes: "I say no longer with any doubt-that a man [or woman]
may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that there as well as
elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perpective; that there
as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup
of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable.""
My challenge to you is that you consider going not where the money is,
but where the problems are. Take that difficult journey and make it not just
of the moment but of a lifetime. For those of you who will respond to these
desperate needs and these urgent problems, I wish you good luck and
Godspeed.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1986, at A2.
66. LIvA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 291 (1991) (citing
BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 17, 1886, at 8).
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